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题名: Optimizing an emission trading scheme for local governments: A Stackelberg game model and hybrid algorithm
作者: Hong, ZF; Chu, CB; Zhang, LDL; Yu, YG
收录类别: SCIE ; SSCI
出版日期: 2017-12
刊名: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS
卷号: 193, 期号:4, 页码:172-182
出版者: ELSEVIER
出版地: AMSTERDAM
英文摘要: This study investigates a policy-making problem for a local government to implement an emission trading scheme by considering the interactive production decisions of firms in its administrative region. The market-based allowance trading price formed freely among the firms in the region is investigated by taking into account regional environmental bearing capacities. Under the scheme, the government sets the emission reduction target of the region and allocates tradable initial allowances to firms, and firms plan their production according to their allowances on hand. A Stackelberg game model is formulated to analyze the decisions of the government and firms aiming to maximize the social welfare of the region and maximize the profit of each firm. In view of the non-concavity and discreteness of the decision model for the government, we propose a hybrid algorithm to solve the game model efficiently. This algorithm consists of a polynomial time dynamic programming, binary search, and genetic algorithm. Results reveal that i) the Stackelberg game model greatly supports local governments' policy-making on the market-driven emission allowance trading scheme, and that ii) the social welfare is a great metric for policy-making decisions on environmental regulations. The market-driven emission trading scheme is an effective mechanism for local governments to induce emission reduction through green technology adoption by firms. However, governments should set their emission reduction targets appropriately because a tight or easy regulation policy significantly affects the environmental and economic benefits as well as the social welfare.
关键词: Emission trading scheme ; Local government ; Social welfare ; Game theory ; Hybrid algorithm
作者部门: [Hong, Zhaofu] Lanzhou Univ, Sch Management, Lanzhou, Gansu, Peoples R China ; [Chu, Chengbin] Univ Paris Saclay, Cent Supelec, Lab Genie Ind, Chatenay Malabry, France ; [Zhang, Linda L.] Catholic Univ Lille, IESEG Sch Management LEM CNRS, Lille, France ; [Hong, Zhaofu ; Yu, Yugang] Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei, Anhui, Peoples R China
通讯作者: Yu, YG (reprint author), Univ Sci & Technol China, Sch Management, Hefei, Anhui, Peoples R China.
学科分类: Engineering; Operations Research & Management Science
文章类型: Article
所属项目编号: National Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [71401067, 71225002, 71520107002, 71472079] ; Thousand Young Scholar Program ; Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities [15LZUJBWZD014, 17LZUJBWTD005] ; China Postdoctoral Science Foundation [2017M610385] ; Guangdong Natural Science Foundation [2014A030313627] ; Foundation for Characteristic Innovation in Higher Education of Guangdong [2014KTSCX187]
所属项目名称: 国家自然科学基金项目 ; 中国博士后科学基金 ; 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金
项目资助者: NSFC ; CPSF ; LZU
语种: 英语
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijpe.2017.07.009
ISSN号: 0925-5273
WOS记录号: WOS:000414814700017
第一机构:
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内容类型: 期刊论文
URI标识: http://ir.lzu.edu.cn/handle/262010/198107
Appears in Collections:管理学院_工商管理&公共管理&信息管理_期刊论文

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Recommended Citation:
Hong, ZF,Chu, CB,Zhang, LDL,et al. Optimizing an emission trading scheme for local governments: A Stackelberg game model and hybrid algorithm[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS,2017,193(4):172-182.
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